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Abstract—Widely-deployed encryption-based security prevents
unauthorized decoding, but does not ensure undetectability of
communication. However, covert, or low probability of detec-
tion/intercept (LPD/LPI) communication is crucial in many
scenarios ranging from covert military operations and the or-
ganization of social unrest, to privacy protection for users of
wireless networks. In addition, encrypted data or even just the
transmission of a signal can arouse suspicion, and even the most
theoretically robust encryption can often be defeated by a deter-
mined adversary using non-computational methods such as side-
channel analysis. Various covert communication techniques were
developed to address these concerns, including steganography
for finite-alphabet noiseless applications and spread-spectrum
systems for wireless communications. After reviewing these covert
communication systems, this article discusses new results on the
fundamental limits of their capabilities, as well as provides a
vision for the future of such systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security and privacy are critical in modern-day wireless
communication. Widely-deployed conventional cryptography
presents the adversary with a problem that he/she is assumed
not to be able to solve because of computational constraints,
while information-theoretic secrecy presents the adversary
with a signal from which he/she cannot extract information
about the message contained therein. However, while these
approaches address security in many domains by protecting
the content of the message, they do not mitigate the threat to
users’ privacy from the discovery of the very existence of the
message itself.
Indeed, transmission attempts expose connections between
the parties involved, and recent disclosures of massive surveil-
lance programs revealed that this “metadata” is widely col-
lected. Furthermore, the transmission of encrypted data can
arouse suspicion, and many cryptographic schemes can be
defeated by a determined adversary using non-computational
means such as side-channel analysis. Anonymous communi-
cation tools such as Tor resist metadata collection and traffic
analysis by randomly directing encrypted messages through
a large network. While these tools conceal the identities of
source and destination nodes in a “crowd” of relays, they
are designed for the Internet and are not effective in wireless
networks, which are typically orders of magnitude smaller.
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Fig. 1: Our vision of a “shadow network”. Most of this article
focuses on the scenario involving the indicated three nodes:
transmitter Alice, receiver Bob, and warden Willie.
Moreover, such tools offer little protection to users whose
communications are already being monitored by the adver-
saries. Thus, secure communication systems should also pro-
vide covert, stealth, or low probability of detection/intercept
(LPD/LPI) communication. Such systems not only protect the
information contained in the message from being decoded,
but also prevent the adversary from detecting the transmission
attempt in the first place and allow communication where it
is prohibited.
The overarching goal of covert wireless communication
research is the establishment of “shadow networks” like that
depicted in Figure 1. They are assembled from relays that
generate, transmit, receive and consume data, and jammers that
generate artificial noise and impair the ability of wardens to
detect the presence of communication (we discuss the details
of this vision in Section IV). However, to create such networks,
we must first learn how to connect their component nodes
by stealthy communication links. Therefore, in this article we
focus on the fundamental limits of such point-to-point links
and address the following question: how much information can
a sender Alice reliably transmit (if she chooses to transmit) to
the intended recipient Bob while hiding it from the adversary,
warden Willie?
We begin in Section II by briefly reviewing the field of
steganography, or the practice of hiding messages in innocuous
objects. Steganography is important as it was arguably the first
covert communication method devised by man. More recently
it has been extensively studied by both the computer science
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2and information theory communities in the context of hiding
information in digital media. However, since steganography
enables covert communication only at the application layer,
its analysis has limited use for physical layer covert com-
munication techniques such as spread-spectrum. Therefore,
in Section III we examine the fundamental limits of covert
communication over analog radio-frequency (RF) channels,
where the information is hidden in the channel artifacts such
as additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN), as well as digital
communication channels, and briefly touch upon the covert
broadcast scenario at the end of the section. We conclude in
Section IV with a discussion of shadow networks and ongoing
research in jammer-assisted covert communication.
II. STEGANOGRAPHY
Covert communication is an ancient discipline: a description
of it is given by Herodotus circa 440 BCE in The Histories,
an account of the Greco-Persian Wars: in Chapter 5 Paragraph
35, Histiaeus shaves the head of his slave, tattoos the message
on his scalp, waits until the hair grows back, and then sends
the slave to Aristagoras with instructions to shave the head
and read the message that calls for an anti-Persian revolt in
Ionia; in Chapter 7 Paragraph 239, Demaratus warns Sparta
of an imminent Persian invasion by scraping the wax off a
wax tablet, scribbling a message on the exposed wood, and
concealing the message by covering the tablet with wax. This
practice of hiding sensitive messages in innocuous objects is
known as steganography.
Modern digital steganography conceals messages in finite-
length, finite-alphabet covertext objects, such as images or
software binary code. Embedding hidden messages in cover-
text produces stegotext, necessarily changing the properties
of the covertext. The countermeasure for steganography, ste-
ganalysis (an analog of cryptanalysis for cryptography), looks
for these changes. Covertext is usually unavailable for ste-
ganalysis (when it is, steganalysis consists of the trivial com-
parison between the covertext and the suspected stegotext).
However, Willie is assumed to have a complete statistical
model of the covertext. The amount of information that can be
embedded without being discovered depends on whether Alice
also has access to this model. If she does, then positive-rate
steganography is achievable: given an O(n)-bit1 secret “key”
that is shared with Bob prior to the embedding, O(n) bits can
be embedded in an n-symbol covertext without being detected
by Willie [1, Chapter 13.1].
Recent work focuses on the more general scenario where
the complete statistical model of the covertext is unavailable
to Alice. Then, Alice can safely embed O(√n log n) bits
by modifying O(√n) symbols out of n in the covertext, at
the cost of pre-sharing O(√n log n) secret bits with Bob.
Note that this square root law of digital steganography
yields zero-rate steganography since limn→∞
O(√n logn)
n = 0
bits/symbol. The proof is available in Chapter 13.2.1 of the
review of pre-2009 work in digital steganography [1]. More
recent work shows that an empirical model of covertext
1We use the Big-O notation in this article, where O(f(n)) denotes an
asymptotic upper bound.
suffices to break the square root law and achieve positive-
rate steganography [2]. Essentially, while embedding at a
positive rate lets Willie obtain O(n) stegotext observations
(enabling detection of Alice when statistics of covertext and
stegotext differ), the increasing size n of the covertext allows
Alice to improve her covertext model and produce statistically-
matching stegotext.
However, steganography is inherently an application layer
covert communication technique. As such, the results for
steganography have limited use in physical layer covert com-
munication. First, analysis of the steganographic systems
generally assumes that stegotext is not corrupted by a noisy
channel. Second, the generalization of the results for stegano-
graphic systems is limited because of their finite-alphabet
discrete nature. Third, by embedding the hidden messages,
Alice replaces part of the covertext. While this effectively
enables the recent positive rate steganography methods [2],
it cannot be done in standard communication systems unless
Alice controls Willie’s noise source. Finally, the most serious
drawback of using steganography for covert communication
is the necessity of transmitting the stegotext from Alice to
Bob—a potentially unrealizable requirement when all commu-
nication is prohibited. We thus consider physical layer covert
communication that employs channel artifacts such as noise
to hide transmissions.
III. PHYSICAL LAYER COVERT COMMUNICATION
We begin the investigation of physical layer covert commu-
nication by considering RF wireless communication. Since its
emergence in the early 20th century, protecting wireless RF
communication from detection, jamming and eavesdropping
has been of paramount concern. Spread spectrum techniques,
devised between the two world wars to address this issue, have
constituted the earliest and, arguably, the most enduring form
of physical layer security.
A. Spread Spectrum Communication
Essentially, the spread spectrum approach involves trans-
mitting a signal that requires a bandwidth WM on a much
wider bandwidth Ws  WM , thereby suppressing the power
spectral density of the transmission below the noise floor.
Spread spectrum systems provide both a covert communication
capability as well as resistance to jamming, fading, and other
forms of interference. A comprehensive review of this field is
available in [3]. Typical spread spectrum techniques include
direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS), frequency-hopping
spread spectrum (FHSS), and their combination.
When Alice uses DSSS, she multiplies the signal waveform
by the spreading sequence—a randomly-generated binary
waveform with a substantially higher bandwidth than the
original signal. The resulting waveform is thus “spread” over a
wider bandwidth, which reduces the power spectral density of
the transmitted signal. Bob uses the same spreading sequence
to de-spread the received waveform and obtain the original
signal. The spreading sequence is exchanged by Alice and
3(a) DSSS (b) FHSS with OFDM and time-hopping.
Fig. 2: Spread spectrum techniques.
Bob prior to transmission and is kept secret from Willie.2
Outside of security applications, the use of public uncorrelated
spreading sequences between transmitter/receiver pairs enables
multiple access; DSSS thus forms the basis of code-division
multiple access (CDMA) protocols used in cellular telephony.
The operation of DSSS is illustrated in Figure 2(a).
When Alice uses FHSS, she re-tunes the carrier frequency
for each transmitted symbol. However, like the spreading
sequence in DSSS, the frequency-hopping pattern is also
randomly generated and secretly shared between her and
Bob prior to the transmission. FHSS can be combined with
orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM), enabling
the use of multiple carrier frequencies. To further reduce the
average transmitted symbol power, FHSS can be used with
time-hopping techniques that randomly vary the duty cycle
(the time-hopping pattern is also secretly pre-shared between
Alice and Bob prior to the transmission). The operation of
FHSS with OFDM and time-hopping is illustrated in Figure
2(b).
Although spread spectrum architectures are well-developed,
the analytical evaluation of covert communication has been
sparse. A. Hero studied secrecy as well as undetectability [4]
in a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) setting, focusing
on the signal processing aspects. He recognized that covert
communication systems are constrained by average power,
and noted the need to explore the fundamental information-
theoretic limits in the conclusion of his work. In fact, knowl-
edge of the limits of any communication system is impor-
tant, particularly since modern coding techniques (such as
Turbo codes and low-density parity check codes) allow 3G/4G
cellular systems to operate near their theoretical channel
capacity, the maximum rate of reliable communication that
is unconstrained by the security requirements. However, while
the secrecy portion of [4] has drawn significant attention, the
covert communication portion has been largely overlooked un-
til our work on the square root limit of covert communication
2While an exchange of a secret prior to covert communication is similar
to a key exchange in symmetric-key cryptography (e.g., one-time pad), an
important distinction is that public-key cryptography techniques cannot be
used to exchange this secret on a channel monitored by Willie without
revealing the intention to communicate.
that we discuss next. We note that the fundamental results that
follow apply not only to the classical spread-spectrum systems,
but also to the modern covert communication proposals that
rely on channel noise and equipment imperfections to hide
communications (as is done, in, e.g., [5]).
B. Square Root Law for Covert Communication over AWGN
Channels
Spread spectrum systems allow communication where it is
prohibited because spreading the signal power over a large
time-frequency space substantially reduces Willie’s signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR). This impairs his ability to discriminate be-
tween the noise and the information-carrying signal corrupted
by noise. Here we determine just how small the power has to
be for the communication to be fundamentally undetectable,
and how much covert information can be transmitted reliably.
Consider an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel
model where the signaling sequence is corrupted by the addi-
tion of a sequence of independent and identically distributed
zero-mean Gaussian random variables with variance σ2. This
is the standard model for a free-space RF channel. Suppose
that the channels from Alice to Bob and to Willie are subject
to AWGN with respective variances σ2b > 0 and σ
2
w > 0,
3
as illustrated in Figure 3(a). Let channel use denote the unit
of communication resource—a fixed time period that is used
to transmit a fixed-bandwidth signal—and let n be the total
number of channel uses available to Alice and Bob (e.g.,
n = WsTs in Figure 2(b)). Willie’s ability to detect Alice’s
transmission depends on the amount of total power that she
uses. Let’s intuitively derive4 Alice’s power constraint assum-
ing that Willie observes these n channel uses. When Alice
is not transmitting, Willie observes AWGN with total power
σ2wn over n channel observations on average. By standard
statistical arguments, with high probability, observations of the
total power lie within ±cσ2w
√
n of this average, where c is
3If the channel from Alice to Bob is noiseless (σ2b = 0) and the channel
from Alice to Willie is noisy (σ2w > 0), then Alice can transmit an infinite
amount of information to Bob; if the channel from Alice to Willie is noiseless
(σ2w = 0), then covert communication is impossible.
4The formal proof is in [6, Section III].
4(a) AWGN channel (b) DMC (c) BSC
Fig. 3: Channel models.
a constant. Since Willie observes Alice’s signal power when
she transmits in addition to the noise power, to prevent Willie
from getting suspicious, the total power that Alice can emit
over n channel uses is limited to O(σ2w
√
n); otherwise her
transmission will be detected (in fact, a standard radiometer
suffices for Willie to detect her if she emits more power,
provided σ2w is known
5). This allows her to reliably transmit
O(σ2w
√
n/σ2b ) covert bits to Bob in n channel uses, but no
more than that [6]. Note that, just like the steganographic
square root law from Section II, this yields a zero-rate channel
(as limn→∞
O(√n)
n = 0 bits/symbol). The similarity of this
square root law for covert communications to the stegano-
graphic square root law is attributable to the mathematics of
statistical hypothesis testing. The additional log n factor in the
steganographic square root law comes from the fact that the
steganographic “channel” to Bob is noiseless.
As in steganography and spread spectrum communication,
prior to communicating, Alice and Bob may share a secret. For
example, a scheme described in [6] and depicted in Figure 4
allows Alice and Bob to reliably transmit O(σ2w
√
n/σ2b ) covert
bits using binary amplitude modulation, any error-correction
code (which can be known to Willie), and O(√n log n) pre-
shared secret bits. The secret contains a random subset S
of n available channel uses (effectively a frequency/time-
hopping pattern), and a random one-time pad of size |S|.
S is generated by flipping a biased random coin n times
with probability of heads O(1/√n): the ith channel use is
selected for transmission if the ith flip is heads; on average,
|S| = O(√n). Knowledge of S allows Bob to discard the
observations that are not in S and decode Alice’s message;
Willie observes mostly noise since he does not have S. Rather
than protecting the message content, the one-time pad prevents
Willie’s exploitation of the error correction code’s structure to
detect Alice.
While the size of the key is asymptotically larger than
the size of the transmitted message, there are many real-
world scenarios where this is an acceptable trade-off to being
detected. Furthermore, the recent extension of [6] to digital
covert communication that we describe next suggests that the
pre-shared secret can be eliminated in some scenarios.
5See [6, Section IV] for the proof.
C. Digital Covert Communication
The discrete memoryless channel (DMC) model describing
digital communication often sheds light on what is feasible
in practical communication systems. DMC model assumes
discrete input and output, which allows the DMC to be
represented using a bipartite graph where the two sets of
vertices correspond to input and output alphabets, and edges
correspond to the stochastic transitions from input to output
symbols. The memoryless nature of the DMC means that its
output is statistically independent from any symbol other than
the input at that time. We illustrate this model in Figure 3(b),
which we augment by designating one of Alice’s inputs as “no
transmission”—a necessary default channel input permitted by
Willie.6
We first consider the binary symmetric channel (BSC)
illustrated in Figure 3(c), which restricts the DMC to binary
input and output alphabet {0, 1}, and the probability of a
crossover from zero at the input to one at the output being
equal to that of a crossover from one to zero. Denote by pb > 0
and pw > 0 the crossover probabilities on Bob’s and Willie’s
BSCs, respectively. It has been shown that, while no more than
O(√n) covert bits can be reliably transmitted in n BSC uses,
if pw > pb, then the pre-shared secret is unnecessary [7].
Channel resolvability can be employed to generalize the
square root law in [7] to DMCs. Channel resolvability is the
minimum input entropy7 needed to generate a channel output
distribution that is “close” (by some measure of closeness
between probability distributions8) to the channel output distri-
bution for a given input; resolvability has been used to obtain
new, stronger results for the information-theoretic secrecy
capacity [8]. If the channels from Alice to both Willie and
Bob are DMCs, and Willie’s channel is worse than Bob’s, then
techniques in [7], [9] can be used to demonstrate the square
root law without a pre-shared secret [10]. Furthermore, as
6For example, this could be the zero-signal in the AWGN channel scenario.
7Essentially, entropy measures “surprise” associated with a random vari-
able, or its “uncertainty”. For example, a binary random variable describing
a flip of a fair coin with equal probabilities of heads and tails has higher
entropy than the binary random variable describing a flip of a biased coin
with probability of heads larger than tails. The output of the biased coin
is more predictable, and less surprising, as one should observe more heads.
Introductory texts on the information theory provide the in-depth discussion
of entropy and other information-theoretic concepts.
8Examples of measures of closeness are variational distance and relative
entropy.
5Fig. 4: Design of a covert communication system that allows Alice and Bob to use any error-correction codes (including those
known to Willie) to reliably transmit O(√n) covert bits using O(√n log n) pre-shared secret bits.
long as the Alice-to-Willie channel is known to Alice, O(√n)
pre-shared secret bits are sufficient for covert communication
when Willie’s channel capacity is greater-than-or-equal to
Bob’s [10]. The results in [10] can be adapted to AWGN
channels as well: a covert communication scheme exists9 that
uses O(√n) pre-shared secret bits, and, if the noise power at
Willie’s receiver is greater than that at Bob’s receiver, then
secret-less covert communication is achievable.
D. Willie’s Ignorance of Transmission Time Helps Alice
When deriving the square root laws, we assume that Willie
knows when the transmission takes place, if it does. However,
in many practical scenarios Alice and Bob have a pre-arranged
time for communication that is unknown to Willie (e.g., a
certain time and day). The transmission might also be short
relative to the total time during which it may take place
(e.g., a few seconds out of the day). If Willie does not know
when the message may be transmitted, he has to monitor
a much longer time period than the time required for the
transmission. It turns out that Willie’s ignorance of Alice’s
transmission time allows her to transmit additional information
to Bob. Surprisingly, under some mild conditions on the
relationship between the total available transmission time and
the transmission duration, Alice and Bob do not even have to
pre-arrange the communication time. The technical details of
this work are provided in [11].
E. Positive-rate Covert Communication
The covert communication channels described above are
zero-rate, since the average number of bits that can be covertly
transmitted per channel use tends to zero as the number of
channel uses n gets large. Here we discuss the possibility
9Conceptually the covert communication scheme that uses O(√n) secret
bits resembles the method that uses O(√n logn) secret bits as described
in Figure 4 and Section III-B; however, its mathematical analysis is highly
technical and is outside the scope of this article.
of positive-rate covert communication, i.e. reliable transmis-
sion of O(n) covert bits in n channel uses. In general, the
circumstances that allow Alice to covertly communicate with
Bob at positive rates occur either when Willie allows Alice to
transmit messages containing information (rather than zero-
signal) or when he is ignorant of the probabilistic structure
of the noise on his channel (note that the applicability of the
steganographic results [2] here is limited since estimation of
the probabilistic structure of the noise on Willie’s channel
is insufficient unless Alice can “replace” this noise rather
than add to it). When Willie allows transmissions, the covert
capacity is the same as the information-theoretic secrecy
capacity (see [9] for treatment of the DMCs). Incompleteness
of Willie’s noise model can also allow positive-rate covert
communication: in the noisy digital channel setting, Willie’s
ignorance of the channel model is a special case of the scenario
in [9]; while in the AWGN channel setting, random noise
power fluctuations have been shown to yield positive-rate
covert communication [12]. The latter result holds even when
the noise power can be bounded; a positive rate is achieved
because Willie does not have a constant baseline of noise for
comparison.
F. Covert Broadcast
Some of the results for the point-to-point covert communi-
cation in the presence of a single warden that are discussed
in this section can easily be extended to scenarios with mul-
tiple independently-controlled receivers. For example, covert
communication over an AWGN channel effectively imposes a
power constraint on Alice. Since a pre-shared secret enables
covert communication in this setting, if each receiver obtains
it prior to communication, Alice can use standard techniques
from network information theory to encode covert messages
to multiple recipients. The extension to a multi-warden setting
as well as other networked scenarios is the ongoing work
discussed next.
6IV. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS SHADOW NETWORKS
Our ultimate objective is to enable a wireless “shadow
network”, illustrated in Figure 1, comprised of transmitters,
receivers, and friendly jammers that generate artificial noise,
impairing wardens’ ability to detect transmissions. While the
relays are valuable and require protection, the jammers can
be cheap, numerous, and disposable (i.e., the adversary can
silence a particular jammer easily, but, because of their great
numbers, silencing enough of them to produce a significant
impact is infeasible). Thus, jammers have been shown to facil-
itate information-theoretically secrecy by confusing the eaves-
dropper even while being completely ignorant of the messages
exchanged by legitimate communicating parties [13].
In covert networks jammer activities are independent from
the relay transmission states: that is, wardens cannot detect
transmissions by listening to the jammers. Thus, jammers
have a parasitic effect on the wardens’ SNRs and are a
nuisance. It is important to characterize the scaling behavior
of such a network, akin to the recent results for the secure
(but not covert) multipath unicast communication in large
wireless networks [14]. The first step towards this goal is
extending the covert communication scenario of this article
to point-to-point jammer-assisted covert communication in the
presence of multiple wardens. Preliminary results [15] assume
that jammers operate at a constant power, and the signal
propagation model accounts only for path loss and AWGN.
However, as [12] demonstrates, uncertainty in noise experi-
enced by the warden is beneficial to Alice. Thus, variable
jamming power and multipath fading should be incorporated
into the jammer-assisted covert communication model, as it
may enable covert communication at a positive rate. Complet-
ing the characterization of the point-to-point covert link in a
multi-warden multi-jammer environment is an important step
towards understanding the behavior of “shadow networks”,
and their eventual implementation.
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